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Abstract
We study the performance of the first-price format in auctions with asymmetric common-values. We
show that, contrary to the result for second-price auctions, a small advantage for one player translates only
to small changes in bidders’ strategies, and the equilibrium remains close to the first-price equilibrium of
the original game. We characterize the equilibrium bidding strategies and their behavior as the degree of
asymmetry increases. Finally, we compare the revenues at the optimal auction, the first-price auction and
the second-price auction.
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1. Introduction
Auction design has been in vogue lately because of the ongoing licensing process for the
third generation mobile telephony services (UMTS) throughout Europe. In those auctions several
countries established rules to counter potentially deleterious effects created by the presence of
asymmetries among bidders. In the valuation of a 3G license there are common and private
components. The common-value arises because profit prospects depend on the development of
the UMTS market as a whole, whereas the private value arises because of the economies of
scope between the new services and the existing GSM business. Operators already active in
GSM services (the incumbents) have an existing infrastructure, a pool of GSM subscribers and
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a database of potential customers which give them a distinct advantage. Also, an incumbent’s
failure to win a license would adversely impact its existing business. Since incumbents face better
initial conditions than newcomers, the private component is asymmetric.1
Asymmetries are prevalent in most auctions in practice. They can be due to the presence of a
bidder to be known to have a special interest beyond that of others in winning the auction.2 They
can also be generated by the presence of liquidity constraints. Firms that operate within imperfect
capital markets face different costs of raising the amount of cash needed for their bids. Notice that
differences in retained earnings, in values of assets appropriate for collateral, or, more generally,
in access to external finance, may easily cause asymmetries among bidders.3
It is known that small asymmetries can crucially affect who wins, and at what price, in standard
ascending auctions for common-value objects. When the auction is conducted as second-price,
the bidder who has a disadvantage compared to her opponent (almost surely) never wins.4 In equi-
librium, the advantageous bidder plays a very aggressive strategy, whereas the disadvantageous
plays very conservatively.5 The rationale behind this equilibrium behavior is clear. Consider such
an auction with two bidders in which they both know that one of them will have for sure a small
additional private value whatever common-value is realized, i.e., consider an almost common-
value auction. Because of the payoff advantage, in an ascending auction the stronger bidder can
bid more aggressively, which forces the weaker bidder to bid even more cautiously in order to
avoid a loss. The more cautious the behavior of the weaker bidder, the more aggressively the
advantageous bidder can bid in this constellation. In equilibrium, the disadvantaged bidder never
outbids the advantageous bidder, because she would make a loss in that case. But then a potential
competitor with a slightly smaller valuation will see no point in entering the auction.6 Moreover,
this result holds even if the difference between types becomes negligible, so that the symmetric
equilibrium a` la Milgrom lies out of the equilibria limit set as one takes a sequence of auctions
converging to the symmetric one.7
The immediate moral is that a standard ascending auction may not be a good choice in an
almost common-value setting as the lack of competition will lower the prices very substantially.
An obvious reaction is to recommend using a first-price auction as “the outcome of a sealed-bid
auction, in stark contrast to that of an ascending auction, is, it is believed, almost unaffected by
small asymmetries among bidders”.8 But, how does it performs? We show here that the first-price
auction gives a disadvantaged bidder a shot at winning. Certainly, an advantageous bidder is more
likely to win a first-price auction as well, but the outcome there is much less certain as she cannot
1 Goeree and Offerman (2003) analiyze competitive bidding in auctions with private and common components. In their
set-up, bidders are ex-ante symmetric whereas here we are interested in auctions for which bidders are ex-ante asymmetric.
2 For example in the FCC auctions it was well known that PacTel had a special interest in acquiring licenses in Los
Angeles and San Francisco (see Cramton, 1997).
3 In the privatization of ENTel (an argentinean telecommunications company) the winner of the ENTel North (Bell
Atlantic and Manufacturers Hanover Corporation) failed to arrange the financing necessary to meet their bid. ENTel
North was awarded to the next bidder, a consortium of buyers including France Telecom and J.P. Morgan.
4 See Bikhchandani (1988); Avery and Kagel (1997); Klemperer (1998), and Bulow and Klemperer (2002) where
second-price common-value auctions with asymmetric bidders are analyzed.
5 Nevertheless, the explosive effect reported in the two bidder case does not generalize to the addition of more
disadvantageous bidders, as shown in Kagel and Levin (2005).
6 In the U.S. radiospectrum auctions, MCI, the third largest telecommunication company did not participate at all. A
similar problem may be behind the low revenue raised by the 2000 Netherlands spectrum auctions.
7 See Bikhchandani (1988) where this result is shown and De Frutos and Pechlivanos (2006) for a discussion about the
robustness of the result when one allows for multidimensional uncertainty.
8 See Bulow and Klemperer (2002; p. 12), where this quotation is taken from.
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follow the strategy of bidding very high. Furthermore, the less aggressive bidding by the strong
firms reduces the severity of the winner’s curse faced by the weak ones, which encourages them to
bid more strongly. Contrary to the results for second-price auctions, the first-price almost common-
value auction has a unique equilibrium (no matter the degree of comparative advantage) which
converges uniformly to the symmetric equilibrium of the symmetric auction as the asymmetry
vanishes. Hence, the symmetric equilibrium is the equilibrium limit as one takes a sequence of
auctions converging to the symmetric one. In this equilibrium a disadvantaged player wins with
strictly positive probability unless the asymmetry is so large that gives the advantaged bidder a
larger ex-ante valuation than the most optimistic disadvantaged bidder. Consequently, potential
competitors with a disadvantage may participate in the auction.9
In view of recent debates over the format of government auctions, studying the effects of asym-
metries on bidding outcomes is of practical as well as of theoretical importance as asymmetries
are the norm and not the exception in many auctions.10 We conclude that a first-price auction is
a good allocation mechanism in the presence of asymmetries.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model. Section 3 provides
the analysis of the first-price auction for the basic model. Section 4 focus on the seller’s expected
revenue. Section 5 generalizes the results in Section 3 as it is devoted to show the robustness of
our results. Finally, Appendix A provides the proofs of two rather technical lemmas.
2. The model
Two risk neutral bidders, player A (advantage) and player D (disadvantage), take part in a first-
price auction: one object is auctioned off and given to the player with the highest bid who pays
his bid. The value of the object to player A is αV , whereas player D’s valuation is δV with α > δ
(thus, player A has a higher ex-post valuation of the object). We will denote an auction in which
the values are αV and δV by (α, δ)-auction. Throughout the paper we focus on a (k, 1)-auction,
k > 1; however, as we go along, we will explain how the results extend easily to any (α, δ)-auction.
For each player V is unknown, but each of them gets a signal (xA and xD, respectively) about
V before they submit their bids. The players’ signals are independent and identically distributed.
Without loss of generality, we can normalize so that both signals are uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]. Finally, following Klemperer (1998), players know that the true value of the object is the
sum of the signals; i.e., V = xA + xD.11
This canonical model encompasses different sources of asymmetries:
• It can be used to analyze situations in which the market value of the object is common to all
bidders (i.e., they compete for common-value objects), but at the same time, each of them may
have an additional private source of gains due to synergies. This could be the case if the object
9 This is consistent with the evidence from the 2001 Danish 3G Auction which was conducted as a firts-price sealed-bid
auction. It attracted a serious bid from a new entrant and shocked analysts with revenues of D 95 per capita, which almost
double most expectations. See Klemperer (2002), and Binmore and Klemperer (2002) for more details.
10 In a recent empirical work, Caputo Silva and Kahn (2001) investigate heterogeneity across different categories of
bidders and find evidence that suggests the importance of private components in bidders valuations in Brazilian auctions.
The authors conclude that caution should be exercised in studies that assume that treasury auctions are in line with a pure
common-values setting.
11 By modelling the common-value in this way, second derivatives with respect to signals vanish, which may be seen as
a limitation. In Section 5 we show that our results hold if other, more general, functional forms were considered.
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being auctioned off is a target firm in a takeover contest, a state-owned enterprise about to be
privatized, or a bankrupted firm under liquidation. The literature refers to these auctions as
almost common-value auctions.
• It can also be used for a pure common-value auctions in which bidders differ in their marginal
utility of income due to the different financial constraints they may face.12 One simple way to
model these differences is to consider that bidder A’s utility is ˆUA = V − rAp and bidder D’s
utility is ˆUD = V − rDp with rA < rD.13 Since bidders’ utility can be rewritten as
UA = V
rA
− p = αV − p and UD = V
rD
− p = δV − p,
our set-up allows for this source of asymmetry, too.
3. Regions
Consider a (k, 1)-auction. This almost common-value auction is equivalent to a common-value
auction in which bidders face interest rates given by rA = 1/k and rD = 1. Using this framework,
it is easy to see that players’ strategic behavior reflect two effects:
• Information effect: players will behave more aggressively the more optimistic is their informa-
tion, i.e., the larger is their signal.
• Wealth effect: players will behave more aggressively the smaller is the interest rate they face.
The interplay between these two effects will determine the qualitative properties of the equi-
librium. In particular, we can distinguish three potential cases by focusing on the impact of these
two effects on the bidding behavior of an A player with signal 0, (A-0, for shortness):
Small asymmetries (1 ≤ k < 2), the information effect dominates and hence player A-0 loses in
equilibrium against any type of player D. For these values of k, the advantage in terms of wealth
is not enough as to compensate the disadvantage coming from the very pessimistic information.
Notice that the valuation of player A-0, conditional upon winning over types of player D below
y, is smaller than the smallest possible valuation of player D-y, i.e., (k/2)y < y for all y∈ (0, 1].
Intermediate asymmetries (2 ≤ k < 3), the wealth effect partially dominates the information
effect. The valuation of player A-0 conditional upon winning is larger than the valuation of a
type of player D with sufficiently pessimistic information. In particular, there will exist a signal
s(k), 0 < s(k) < 1, such that, in equilibrium, player A-0 wins over any player D with signal
below s(k).
Large asymmetries (k ≥ 3), the wealth effect dominates the information effect and hence player
D will never win the auction.14 The valuation of player A-0 conditional upon winning is larger
than the one of player D-1, i.e., (k/2) ≥ (1 + (1/2)).
12 For more on auctions with financially constrained bidders (see Che and Gale, 1998).
13 In the US spectrum auctions designated firms were given bidding credits (see Ayres and Cramton (1996)). These
credits which were intended to offset any disadvantage these firms faced in raising capital (see Cramton, 2001) constitute
a good real life example of the existence of different financial constraints.
14 In the Netherlands UMTS auction, the expected value of a license for the incumbents was estimated in D 5 billions
whereas for entrants was estimated in D 0.5 billions. Asymmetries were hence large.
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In what follows we analyze the equilibrium bidding strategies in the three possible scenarios.
But first, we here state a lemma which guarantees the smoothness of the bidding functions when
asymmetries are either small or intermediate.
Lemma 1. If 1 ≤ k < 3 holds, then over the common bidding range, bidders’ equilibrium strate-
gies are given by continuous and strictly increasing functions, bAk (xA) and bDk (xD), such that
bAk (1) = bDk (1) = m(k) ≤ 2. Moreover, if 1 ≤ k < 2 then bAk (0) = bDk (0) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
3.1. Small asymmetries: 1 ≤ k < 2
When differences in values are small, so that the information effect dominates, we will show
that there is a unique equilibrium in which bidding strategies, bAk (xA) and bDk (xD), are the solutions
to a system of differential equations with boundary conditions bAk (0) = bDk (0) = 0 and bAk (1) =
bDk (1) = m(k) ≤ 2, for any k ∈ [1, 2).15
Lemma 1 implies that the bidding functions are two homeomorphisms with continuous and
well-defined inverses. Consequently, there exist “equilibrium correspondences”, i.e., there exist
functions φAk and φDk such that
bAk (φAk (xD)) = bDk (xD),
bDk (φDk (xA)) = bAk (xA).
Notice that φik(xj) = (bik)
−1(bjk(xj)) is a continuous and strictly increasing function, with
φik(φjk(xi)) = xi, for any i, j = A,D with i = j. Further,φAk (0) = φDk (0) = 0 andφAk (1) = φDk (1) =
1. The interpretation of this functions is clear. In equilibrium, player A with signal xA bids the
same price than player D with signal φDk (xA). Similarly, player D with signal xD bids the same
price than player A with signal φAk (xD).
We can hence think of the problem faced by player D as choosing against whom to lose or,
equivalently, choosing the opponent signals to beat.16 Formally, a player D with signal xD chooses
xA to maximize her expected utility:
maxxA
∫ xA
0
(xD + t − bAk (xA)) dt.
Notice that player D’s expected utility can be written as
UxD (xA) = xDxA +
x2A
2
− xAbAk (xA).
A sufficient condition for this function to be differentiable is that xAbAk (xA) be differentiable.17
Setting the derivatives of the expected utilities equal to zero, and using the definition of the
equilibrium correspondences, we next characterize the equilibrium bid functions.
15 Throughout the paper, the subscript in the bidding function denotes the value of k, and the superscript denotes the
identity of the player, i.e., A or D.
16 A similar approach is taken in Bulow et al. (1999), see also Maskin and Riley (2000).
17 In Appendix A we show the differentiability of the expected utility.
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Lemma 2. For any k ∈ [1, 2), the necessary and sufficient conditions for the bidding functions
(bAk , bDk ) to form a Nash equilibrium are that they are increasing functions solving the differential
system
bAk (xA) + (bAk )
′(xA)xA = φDk (xA) + xA (1)
bDk (xD) + (bDk )
′(xD)xD = k(φAk (xD) + xD) (2)
with boundary conditions: bAk (0) = bDk (0) = 0 and bAk (1) = bDk (1) = m(k), where m(k) ≤ 2.
Since φik(φjk(xi)) = xi must hold for i, j = A,D with i = j, system above which has two dif-
ferential equations is, in fact, a system of four differential equations. Notice that by changing
variables (xA by φAk (xD) in the first equation, and xD by φDk (xA) in the second equation), two
“new” equations are obtained. These equations are:
(bDk (xD)φAk (xD))
′ = (φAk )
′(xD)(xD + φAk (xD)), (3)
(bAk (xA)φDk (xA))
′ = k(φDk )
′(xA)(xA + φDk (xA)). (4)
Integrating (3), we get∫
φAk (xD) dxD = −bDk (xD)φAk (xD) + φAk (xD)xD +
1
2
(φAk (xD))
2 + C1. (5)
Similarly, integrating (4), we get∫
φDk (xA) dxA = −
1
k
bAk (xA)φDk (xA) + φDk (xA)xA +
1
2
(φDk (xA))
2 + C2. (6)
Using (5) and (6) and the boundary condition bAk (0) = bDk (0) = 0, we can get explicit expressions
for the bidding functions after integrating the Eqs. (3) and (4). The resulting bidding functions
are:
bAk (xA) =
k
2
(φDk (xA) + xA)
2
φDk (xA) + kxA
, (7)
and
bDk (xD) =
k
2
(xD + φAk (xD))
2
kφAk (xD) + xD
· (8)
The upper boundary condition bAk (1) = bDk (1) = m(k) yields m(k) = 2k/(k + 1)· Hence, the max-
imum bid is a strictly increasing function in the degree of asymmetry as measured by k. Finally,
L’Hoˆpital rule and φ′i(0) = (b′j(0)/b′i(0)) > 0 imply
lim
xA→0
bAk (xA) = lim
xD→0
bDk (xD) = 0.
Using these bidding functions we next characterize the equilibrium correspondences.
Proposition 3. The following statements hold:
(i) If k = 1, then φA1 (xA) = xA and φD1 (xD) = xD.
(ii) If k ∈ (1, 2), then φAk (xD) and φDk (xD) are uniquely implicitly defined by the equations
(k + 1)k−1x2k−1D = (φAk )
2−k(kφAk + xD)
k−1
, (9)
6
and
(k + 1)k−1(φDk )
2k−1 = x2−kA (kxA + φDk )
k−1
. (10)
Proof. We here only show the result for φAk . The proof for φDk is completely analogous, and is
hence omitted.
By substituting the expression of the bidding function bDk (xD) given in Eq. (8) into (2), we get
the differential equation
(φAk )
′(xD) = (φ
A
k (xD))
2
k(2k − 1) + kxDφAk (xD)
(2 − k)x2D + kxDφAk (xD)
, (11)
which is a homogeneous equation with boundary condition φAk (1) = 1. The change of variables
uk(xD) = φAk (xD)/xD, yields
(uk)′(xD)xD = uk(xD)(2k − 2) kuk(xD) + 12 − k + kuk(xD) ,
with boundary condition uk(1) = 1.
If k = 1 then (u1)′(xD) = 0 and, consequently, φA1 (xD) = xD. If k > 1 then the solution of the
differential equation gives
(k + 1)k−1x2k−1D = (φAk )
2−k(kφAk + xD)
k−1
,
as claimed.
To end the proof we now show that implicit equation above has a unique positive solution
φAk ∈ [0, 1] for every xD ∈ [0, 1]. To see this, consider by way of contradiction, that there is
xD = y, y∈ (0, 1), such that both φAk and ϕAk are solutions to the implicit equation. Let, w.l.o.g.,
0 < φAk < ϕAk . Since both of them satisfy the implicit equation, straightforward computations
give (
φAk
ϕAk
)2−k
=
(
y + kϕAk
y + kφAk
)k−1
> 1,
a contradiction. 
We now proceed to analyze the properties of the equilibrium correspondences. We first present
the results and then discuss their implications.
Proposition 4. An advantageous bidder is more likely to win the auction as, φAk (x) < x < φDk (x)
holds for all x∈ (0, 1) and for any k ∈ (1, 2).
Proof. Let k > 1 be fixed. Assume, by way of contradiction, that there exists x∈ (0, 1) such that
φDk (x) = x. For this x, implicit Eq. (10) becomes
(k + 1)k−1x2k−1 = x2−k(kx + x)k−1,
which easily simplifies to x2k−1 = x. Since k > 1 this equality only holds if x = 0 or x = 1, a
contradiction. The continuity of φDk (x) and φDk (x) = x for all x∈ (0, 1) imply that φDk is either
below or above the diagonal. Moreover, as φAk is the inverse function of φDk , if one is above the
other one is below, and vice-versa.
7
Evaluating Eq. (10) at x = 1/2, straightforward computations give:(
φDk
(
1
2
))2k−1
= 1
2
(
k + 2φDk (1/2)
k + 1
)k−1
>
1
2
(
k
k + 1
)k−1
>
1
2k
·
Inequality above implies
φDk
(
1
2
)
>
1
2k/(2k−1)
>
1
2
.
Since φDk (1/2) > 1/2, and since there is no x∈ (0, 1) such that φDk (x) = x, we conclude that
φAk (x) < x < φDk (x) for all x∈ (0, 1) and for all k ∈ (1, 2), as claimed. 
Proposition 5. For any given x∈ (0, 1), the equilibrium correspondence functions satisfy
(i) φAk (x) is decreasing in k,
(ii) φDk (x) is increasing in k,
(iii) limk→1+φAk (x) = limk→1+φDk (x) = x.
Proof. For any pair k1, k2 such that 1 < k1 < k2 < 2, incentive compatibility implies that the
following inequalities must hold in equilibrium:[
k1
(
x + φ
D
k1
(x)
2
)
− bAk1 (x)
]
φDk1 (x) ≥
[
k1
(
x + φ
D
k2
(x)
2
)
− bAk2 (x)
]
φDk2 (x),[
k2
(
x + φ
D
k2
(x)
2
)
− bAk2 (x)
]
φDk2 (x) ≥
[
k2
(
x + φ
D
k1
(x)
2
)
− bAk1 (x)
]
φDk1 (x).
Adding up inequalities above gives
(k2 − k1)
(
x + φ
D
k1
(x)
2
)
φDk1 (x) ≤ (k2 − k1)
(
x + φ
D
k2
(x)
2
)
φDk2 (x).
Since k2 > k1, we have φDk1 (x) ≤ φDk2 (x). This result and the inverse relationship between the
equilibrium correspondences imply (i) and (ii).
Regarding (iii), if x = 0 or x = 1, it hods trivially. We can hence concentrate in the case
x∈ (0, 1). Consider the sequence {φDkn (x)} as {kn} → 1 (with all kn ∈ (1, 2)). For any n, Eq. (10)
yields
(φDkn )
2kn−1 =
(
knx + φDkn
kn + 1
)kn−1
x2−kn .
Moreover, for any x there exists x > 0 such that (knx + φDkn )/(kn + 1) > x holds for large enough
n. Consequently,(
knx + φDkn
kn + 1
)kn−1
→ 1, as n → ∞
and statement (iii) follows. Similar arguments apply for φAkn (x) which completes the proof. 
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The implications of discussions above and Proposition 5 are several:
• The probabilities of winning the auction are sensitive to the degree of comparative advantage.
In particular, the larger is k, the more likely is for the advantageous player to win the auction.
• Increasing the comparative advantage (as measured by k) makes the advantageous player to bid
more aggressively. That is (∂bAk (x)/∂k) > 0 for all x > 0. This is what we expect as a higher
k makes the A bidder more eager to win. As for the D player, we know that when she has
sufficiently optimistic information (in particular when xD = 1), she bids more aggressively if
k is increased. Our conjecture is that the opposite should hold for types of the D bidder with
sufficiently pessimistic information. The intuition is that they face a larger winner’s curse of
winning against a more aggressive A bidder, and this should make them reluctant to increase
their bid.
• The profits of the advantageous (disadvantageous) bidder are strictly increasing (decreasing)
in k. Notice that from the Envelope Theorem we have
dΠik
dxi
=
{
kφDk (xA), if i = A
φAk (xD), if i = D
.
Hence, ΠAk (xA) = ΠAk (0) + k
∫ xA
0 φ
D
k (z) dz which is strictly increasing in k. Similarly,
ΠDk (xD) = ΠDk (0) +
∫ xD
0 φ
A
k (z) dz which is strictly decreasing in k.
• Finally, Proposition 5(iii) suggests that as the auction converges to a symmetric one in which
both bidders are known to be D-type, the strategies converge to the unique symmetric equilib-
rium strategies of the symmetric auction. Next theorem shows that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 6. The unique equilibrium bidding functions (bAk , bDk ) of the (k, 1)-auction game con-
verge uniformly to the unique equilibrium bidding functions of the (1, 1)-auction game as k
converges to 1.
Proof. Pointwise convergence follows trivially from Proposition 5. Because of the functional
form of the bidding functions, their uniform convergence to the unique equilibrium bidding
functions of the (1, 1)-auction follow from the uniform convergence of the equilibrium corre-
spondences to the identity map. In what follows we show uniform convergence for φAk (xD). The
case of φDk (xA) follows similarly.
From previous results we know that φAk (xD) is a strictly increasing differentiable function such
that φAk (0) = 0, φAk (1) = 1 and φAk (xD) > xD for all xD ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, the derivative is given
by
(φAk )
′(xD) = (φ
A
k (xD))
2
k(2k − 1) + kxDφAk (xD)
(2 − k)x2D + kxDφAk (xD)
.
We want to show that, given ε > 0, there exist k0 such that xD < φAk (xD) < xD + ε for all
k ≥ k0 and all x∈ [0, 1]. To do so we notice that, for a fixed k > 1, the equation (φAk )
′(xD) = 1
has a unique solution (in (0, 1)) lying in the straight line
φAk (xD) =
√
2 − k
k(2k − 1)xD.
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The slope of this straight line tends to 1 as k → 1. Let k0 > 1 be the value of k such that the above
straight line is totally contained between y = xD and y = xD + . The Mean Value Theorem, and
the fact that φAk (·) is a decreasing function of k, implies that for all k ≥ k0 we have xD < φAk (xD) <
xD + ε, as desired. 
3.2. Intermediate asymmetries: 2 ≤ k < 3
As the difference in values increase, the information effect no longer dominates and hence
players A-0 and D-0 behave differently in the auction. In particular, player A-0 must win the
auction with positive probability. In this scenario, there will exist a signal s(k) > 0 for the dis-
advantageous bidder such that bAk (0) = bDk (s(k)) = α(k) > 0. Further, the only possible atoms in
the bidding functions occur at the bottom of the common bidding prices, as shown in Lemma
1. Consequently, let us define r(k) as the highest xA that satisfies bAk (r(k)) = bDk (s(k)). Notice
that r(k) = 0 is not ruled out a priory. Finally, bAk (1) = bDk (1) = m(k) < 2 must also hold in any
equilibrium candidate.
Lemma 7. For any k ∈ [2, 3), in equilibrium bidders A-0 and D-s(k) must break even.
Proof. Clearly, D-s(k) cannot make negative profits or she would be better off by reducing her
bid so as to lose with probability one. But she cannot make positive profits either. Otherwise, a D
player with signal s(k) − ε would have incentives to raise her bid, a contradiction with equilibrium
behavior.
The result for the A-0 bidder follows from the definition of s(k). Since conditional upon winning
bidder A-0 and bidder D-s(k) assign the same value to the object, it follows that ks(k)/2 = s(k) +
r(k)/2. Consequently, ΠAk (xA) =s(k)(ks(k)/2 − bAk (0)) equals zero as bAk (0) = bDk (s(k)). 
Corollary 8. For k ∈ [2, 3) we have
(i) α(k) = ks(k)2 ;(ii) r(k) = (k − 2)s(k).
The equilibrium bidding strategies of players with signals xA > r(k) and xD > s(k), are increas-
ing differentiable functions, which are solutions of the system given by Eqs. (3) and (4) with
boundary conditions bAk ((k − 2)s(k)) = bDk (s(k)) = ks(k)/2 and bAk (1) = bDk (1) = m(k). Integrat-
ing, and using the boundary conditions, we get explicit expressions for the truncated bidding
functions (bAk , bDk ) in terms of the equilibrium correspondences. Moreover, Lemma 7 and Corollary
8 allow us to fully characterize the equilibrium bidding functions. Let
bAk (xA) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ks(k)
2
, if 0 ≤ xA < r(k)
k
2
(xA + φDk (xA))
2
φDk (xA) + kxA
, if r(k) ≤ xA ≤ 1
, (12)
and
bDk (xD) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
xD + r(k)2 , if 0 ≤ xD < s(k)
k
2
(xD + φAk (xD))
2
kφAk (xD) + xD
, if s(k) ≤ xD ≤ 1
. (13)
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In what follows, we show that bAk (xA) given by (12) and bDk (xD) given by (13) are equilibrium
bidding strategies.
Proposition 9. The bidding functions (bAk (xA), bDk (xD)), given by (12) and (13), constitute an
equilibrium of the (k, 1)-auction for any k ∈ [2, 3). Furthermore,
s(k) = (k − 2)(k−2)/2(k−1) k − 1(k + 1)1/2
Proof. Clearly a D player with signal below s(k) does not want to deviate up so as to win over
some types of player A. Just notice that the minimum bid is larger than her value conditional
upon winning. Similarly, a D player with signal larger than s(k) plays a best response against the
strategy of the A player. There is hence no profitable deviation for the D player. Consider now the
A player. If her signal is y and it is below r(k), her expected profit when playing the equilibrium
strategy is
ΠA-y(bAk (y), bDk (xD)) = kys(k) ≥ 0, for all y∈ [0, r(k)].
Since the A player with signal r(k) does not want to deviate up (recall that the truncated bidding
functions are best reply to each other), then no other type with worse information will want
to deviate either. Thus the only deviation we have to consider is a deviation to a bid below
ks(k)/2. Let β be such that β < (ks(k)/2). For any y, y∈ [0, r(k)], the expected profit when bidding
β is
ΠA-y(β, bDk (xD)) =
[
k
(
y + 2β − r(k)
4
)
− β
](
2β − r(k)
2
)
.
The probability of winning is now smaller but, further, the profit when winning is also smaller.
Notice that
k
(
2β − r(k)
4
)
− β ≤ 0, as 2β(k − 2) ≤ k(k − 2)s(k).
We hence conclude that no deviation down is profitable as
ΠA-y(bAk (y), bDk (xD)) ≥ ΠA-y(β, bDk (xD)), for all β <
ks(k)
2
and all y ≤ r(k).
Finally, the A player with signal larger than r(k) plays a best response against the strategy of the
D player. So the purported strategies constitute an equilibrium. Since over the common bidding
range, the functional forms of the equilibrium bidding functions coincide with the ones obtained for
small asymmetries, the equilibrium correspondences φAk (xD) and φDk (xA) are (uniquely) defined
by the Eqs. (9) and (10). Using those equations we can fully characterize the minimum winning
bid. In particular, straightforward computations yield:
s(k) = (k − 2)−((k−2)/2(k−1)) (k − 1)(k + 1)1/2 . 
Notice that limk→2s(k) = (1/3)
√
3 and s(3) = 1. Consequently, limk→2α(k) = (1/3)
√
3 and
α(3) = 3/2. These results suggest that as k converges to 3 the probability of winning the auction
for the D player converges to zero. Next subsection shows that this is indeed the case.
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3.3. Large asymmetries: k ≥ 3
When the asymmetry in values is such that the A-0 player can assign to the object a larger
ex-ante expected value than the most optimistic D player (i.e., when k/2 ≥ 3/2) then, in any
equilibrium, the A player must win the auction.
Proposition 10. The following strategies constitute an equilibrium of the (k, 1)-auction game
for any k ≥ 3,
bAk (xA) = 32 ;
bDk (xD) = xD + 12 .
Proof. We first show that no type of player D wants to deviate. At the purported equilibrium
strategies player D gets zero profits. By deviating and bidding more than 3/2, she gets nega-
tive profits as she would pay more than the true value conditional on her winning. Notice that,
conditional on winning, the value is bounded above by 3/2 for any D player.
Consider now the A player. We now show that type 0 prefers to outbid all types of player D
rather than a set of them. At the purported equilibrium the profits of type 0 are:
ΠA-0
(
3
2
, bDk (xD)
)
= k
2
− 3
2
Consider now a bid equal to m such that 1/2 ≤ m < 3/2. She wins over all types of D smaller
than y where y is such that y + 1/2 = m. Her expected profits from bidding m are
ΠA-0(m, bDk (xD)) =
(
k
2m − 1
4
− m
)
2m − 1
2
Since her probability of winning with a bid equal to m is below one, we have
ΠA-0(m, bDk (xD)) < k
2m − 1
4
− m ≤ k − 3
2
, for all k ≥ 3.
Hence ΠA−0(m, bDk (xD)) < ΠA−0(3/2, bDk (xD)). If type 0 does not find profitable to deviate, then
no other type will have incentives to deviate either, which completes the proof. 
Equilibrium above is qualitatively unique as in any equilibrium for k ≥ 3, the advantageous
bidder always bids 3/2 and the disadvantageous (almost) never wins.18
Fig. 1 illustrates the behavior of the equilibrium bidding functions in the three possible sce-
narios.
3.4. (α, δ)-Auctions
To end this section we now show how our results generalize to any (α, δ)-auction, α > δ > 0.
In particular, we now show that a (α, δ)-auction is strategically equivalent to a (α/δ, 1)-auction,
which ensures that there is no loss of generality by focusing on (k, 1)-auctions.
18 Nevertheless, there is a family of equilibrium bids for the D player. In particular, bD
k
(xD) = ρ + (3/2 − ρ)xD is an
equilibrium bid for any ρ∈ [0, 1/2].
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Fig. 1. Equilibrium bidding functions in the three possible scenarios: (a) k ∈ (1, 2), (b) k ∈ [2, 3), and (c) k > 3.
Throughout this subsection, biα,δ stands for player i’s equilibrium bidding function in a (α, δ)-
auction. In particular, for the sake of consistency, we will here write bik,1 to refer to player i’s
equilibrium bidding function in a (k, 1)-auction.
Lemma 11. The equilibrium bidding functions of a (α, δ)-auction are given by bAα,δ(xA) =
δbAk,1(xA) and bDα,δ(xD) = δbDk,1(xD) for k = α/δ.
Proof. Two cases have to be considered depending on whether α/δ ≥ 3 or α/δ < 3.
If α/δ ≥ 3, similar arguments to the ones used in the proof of Proposition 10 ensure that
bAα,δ(xA) = δ
3
2
,
bDα,δ(xD) = δ
(
xD + 12
)
.
constitute an equilibrium of the (α, δ)-auction game.
If α/δ < 3, the equilibrium bidding functions over the common range of bidding prices have
to be increasing functions solving the system of differential equations
(xAbAα,δ(xA))
′ = δ(φDα,δ(xA) + xA)
(xDbDα,δ(xD))
′ = α(φAα,δ(xD) + xD)
(14)
whereφAα,δ(xD) andφDα,δ(xA) are the equilibrium correspondences of the (α, δ)-auction game. Since
bAα/δ,1(xA) and bDα/δ,1(xD) solve the system given by Eqs. (3) and (4), then it is easily verified that
bAα,δ(xA) = δbAα/δ,1(xA) and bDα,δ(xD) = δbDα/δ,1(xD) solve system (14), as claimed. 
4. Expected revenue
Expected revenue to the seller is the sum of the ex-ante expected payments by the players.
For player i with signal xi, her interim expected payment will be bik(xi)φjk(xi), i, j = A,D. For the
advantaged player it increases with k as both her bid and her probability of winning are increasing
functions of k. For the disadvantaged player her expected payment will be (most likely) decreasing
in k for sufficiently pessimistic information. Nevertheless, for the most optimistic D player the
opposite holds as her bid increases with k whereas her probability of winning is always one. The
impact of k on the expected revenue is hence unclear a priory.
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To compute the expected revenue we first note that integrating by parts Eq. (3) results in
bAk (xA)φDk (xA) = k
∫ xA
0
(φDk (t))
′(φDk (t) + t) dt
= k
(
1
2
(φDk (xA))
2 + xAφDk (xA) −
∫ xA
0
φDk (t) dt
)
,
which implies∫ 1
0
bAk (x)φDk (x) dx = k
∫ 1
0
[
1
2
(φDk (x))
2 + 2xφDk (x)
]
dx − k(3k − 1)
2(k + 1) ,
where,
∫ 1
0 φ
D
k (x) dx = ((3k − 1)/2(k + 1)) is derived from Eq. (6). Similarly,∫ 1
0
bDk (x)φAk (x) dx =
∫ 1
0
[
1
2
(φAk (x))
2 + 2xφAk (x)
]
dx − (3 − k)
2(k + 1) · (15)
Changing variables in (15), take x = φAk (t), revenue to the seller becomes
RSk =
5k − 3
2(k + 1) −
∫ 1
0
(
(2k − 1)
(
(φAk (xD))
2
2
)
− (2 − k)xDφAk (xD)
)
dxD (16)
Bikhchandani (1988) and Klemperer (1998) have shown that second-price auctions are
considerably less desirable for the seller in asymmetric environments than in symmetric ones.
They showed that a small asymmetry in values has a large impact on the seller’s expected
revenues. We have shown here that a small asymmetry in values has only a small impact on
outcomes when the auction is conducted as a first-price auction. But, further, we now show that
it is beneficial for the seller.
Proposition 12. A small asymmetry in values is beneficial for the seller.
Proof. Differentiating Eq. (16) with respect to k gives
∂Rk
∂k
= 4(k + 1)−2 −
∫ 1
0
(φAk (t))
2 dt −
∫ 1
0
tφAk (t) dt + −(2k − 1)
∫ 1
0
φAk (t)
∂φAk (t)
∂k
dt
+(2 − k)
∫ 1
0
t
∂φAk (t)
∂k
dt
Using the fact that φAk (x) = x for k = 1 and for all x∈ [0, 1], it is easily verified that
(∂RSk/∂k|k=1) = (1/3) > 0.19 Hence a small asymmetry (k close enough to one) is beneficial
for the seller. 
From the proof of proposition above it is easy to see that the expected revenue is also increasing
at k = 2. If this were always the case when there are asymmetries, it would imply that in the first-
price auction the seller benefits from the asymmetry among bidders. To examine this issue and to
illustrate how the degree of comparative advantage translates into payments, we now provide the
seller’s revenue for some values of k. The choice of these values is not arbitrary. We have taken
19 Formally, we here provide the right derivative.
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those for which φAk (xD) can be explicitly determined. In particular, straightforward integration
gives
φA1 (xD) = xD φA1.5(xD) =
xD(
√
1+15x2D−1)
3 φ
A
2 (xD) =
xD(3x2D−1)
2 φ
A
3 (xD) = 0
R1 = 23 = 0.666 R1.5 = 0.837 R2 = 0.967 R3 = 1.5
Table above suggests that the seller’s revenue increases with the degree of comparative advan-
tage, and that significant asymmetries (k ≥ 2) translate into large rents. The economic intuition
behind this fact follows from two effects. On one hand, an increase in k makes the object more
valuable for the advantageous bidder who is then more willing to bid higher in order to ensure
her winning. On the other hand, an increase in k aggravates the situation of the disadvantageous
player who must now make an extra effort to win the auction. In particular, if she has sufficiently
optimistic information about the common-value (her signal is sufficiently high), she is force to
bid higher the greater is her disadvantage. Since both effect are aligned, the impact of a larger
asymmetry is a larger payment and hence a larger seller’s revenue.
To better asses the performance of the first-price format, in what follows we characterize the
optimal auction to compare the seller’s expected revenue in the first-price auction with the optimal
auction and with the second-price auction.
4.1. The optimal auction
From the revelation principle we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms. Denote by
mik(xi, xj) the payment from i to the auctioneer when reported signals are xi and xj , and by
pik(xi, xj) the probability that i gets the asset. Conditional on signal xi and announcement xˆi,
bidder i’s expected payoff is
Uik(xˆi/xi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∫ 1
0
(kv(xi, xj)pik(xˆi, xj) − mik(xˆi, xj))f (xj) dxj, if i = A∫ 1
0
(v(xi, xj)pik(xˆi, xj) − mik(xˆi, xj))f (xj) dxj, if i = D
,
and his truthtelling payoff is Πik(xi) ≡ Uik(xi/xi).
The optimal auction solves the following problem
maxmA
k
,mD
k
∈R,pA
k
,pD
k
∈ [0,1]
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(mAk (xA, xD) + mDk (xA, xD))f (xA) dxAf (xD) dxD
s.t. Πik(xi) ≥ 0, for all xi, i = 1, 2
Πik(xi) ≥ Uik(xˆi/xi), for all xi, xˆi, i = 1, 2,
and such that the probabilities satisfy standard feasibility conditions, pik ∈ [0, 1] and pik + pjk ≤
1. The optimal auction maximizes the seller’s expected revenue subject to the constraints of
individual rationality, incentive compatibility and feasibility.
Using the Envelope Theorem and applying standard techniques adapted from Myerson (1981),
we have
dΠik
dxi
=
{
kQAk (xA), if i = A
QDk (xD), if i = D
.
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and
Πik(xi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ΠAk (0) + k
∫ xA
0
QAk (z) dz, if i = A
ΠDk (0) +
∫ xD
0
QDk (z) dz, if i = D
,
where Qik(xi) stands for bidder i’s probability of winning when his signal is xi. Since Qik(xi) =∫ 1
0 p
i
k(xi, xj) dxj , we can rewrite ex-ante profits as
Πik =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ΠAk (0) + k
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(1 − xA)pAk (xA, xD) dxA dxD, if i = A
ΠDk (0) +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(1 − xD)pDk (xA, xD) dxD dxA, if i = D.
As expected profits are expected values minus expected payments, the optimal auction solves the
problem
maxΠi
k
(0),pi
k
− ΠAk (0) − ΠDk (0) +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
k(v(xA, xD) − (1 − xA))pAk (xA, xD) dxA dxD
+
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(v(xA, xD) − (1 − xD))pDk (xA, xD) dxD dxA,
where k(v(xA, xD) − (1 − xA)) = k(2xA + xD − 1) is the marginal revenue of bidder A, and
v(xA, xD) − (1 − xD) = xA + 2xD − 1 is the marginal revenue of bidder D.
Lemma 13. The optimal auction sets
(i) ΠAk (0) = ΠDk (0) = 0,
(ii) pAk (xA, xD) =
⎧⎨
⎩1, if xA ≥
1 − xD
2
and xA ≥ (2 − k)xD + k − 12k − 1 ;
0, otherwise.
(iii) pDk (xA, xD) =
⎧⎨
⎩1, if xD ≥
1 − xA
2
and xA ≤ (2 − k)xD + k − 12k − 1 ;
0, otherwise.
Proof. Setting Πik(0) > 0 is suboptimal and Πik(0) < 0 violates the individual rationality or
participation constraint. Since 2xi + xj − 1 may be negative it is optimal to have pAk (xA, xD) +
pAk (xA, xD) < 1, a reserve price. Finally, the optimal allocation rule sets pik(xA, xD) = 1 only if
the marginal revenue of bidder i is larger than the one of bidder j. 
The optimal auction is biased against the disadvantage bidder. He wins the good only if his
signal is sufficiently higher than the one of her opponent. To see this consider the case in which
both bidders receive the same signal x ≥ 1/3. Bidder A wins with certainty as k(3x − 1) >
3x − 1 for any k > 1. Thus the disadvantageous bidder must have a signal strictly higher than
the one of the advantageous bidder to win. Nevertheless the optimal auction does not exclude
the disadvantageous bidder from bidding. For a given signal xD, the signal by the advantageous
bidder must be higher than ((2 − k)xD + k − 1)/(2k − 1) to win.
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At the optimal auction revenue to the seller becomes
ROPk = k
∫ 1/3
0
∫ 1
(1−xD)/2
(2xA + xD − 1) dxA dxD
+k
∫ 1
1/3
∫ 1
((2−k)xD+(k−1))/(2k−1)
(2xA + xD − 1) dxA dxD
+
∫ 1
1/2
∫ ((2−k)xD+(k−1))/(2k−1)
0
(2xD + xA − 1) dxA dxD
+
∫ 1/2
1/3
∫ ((2−k)xD+(k−1))/(2k−1)
1−2xD
(2xD + xA − 1) dxA dxD
= 1
36
(2k − 1)−1(42k2 − 19k + 3)
4.2. Revenue at the SPA
When the auction is conducted as second-price, in equilibrium, the advantageous bidder plays a
very aggressive strategy, whereas the disadvantageous plays very conservatively. In particular, the
following strategies constitute an equilibrium for any k > 1, bAk (xA) = xA + 1 and bDk (xD) = xD
(see Bikhchandani, 1988).
The second-price auction generates an expected revenue equal to 1/2.20
4.3. Revenue comparison
We have shown that the optimal auction does not exclude the disadvantageous bidder from
bidding. This is also the case at the first-price auction, whereas it does not hold at the second-
price auction. Further, in both first-price and optimal, revenue increases with k, whereas it is
independent of k at the second-price auction. It is hence clear that the first-price is closer to
the optimal than the second-price. To see the difference in expected revenues between the three
mechanisms, table below provides the expected seller revenue at the optimal auction (ROP),
at a second-price auction (RSP) and at the first-price auction (RFP) for different values of
k.21
k = 1 k = 1.5 k = 2 k = 3
RSP = 0.5 RSP = 0.5 RSP = 0.5 RSP = 0.5
RFP = 0.666 RFP = 0.837 RFP = 0.967 RFP = 1.5
ROP = 0.722 ROP = 0.958 ROP = 1.231 ROP = 1.8
The comparison for all values of k is the content of Fig. 2. To obtain this figure, for the first-
price auction, we have numerically approximated the equilibrium correspondences, the bidding
functions and the expected revenue (Fig. 2).22
20 There is a continuum of expected prices ranging from 0 to 1/2. Nonetheless, the lower bound can be reached only if
the disadvantageous bidder bids less than her individual rational bid.
21 As explained before, the choice of these values is not arbitrary. We have taken those for which the seller’s expected
revenue can be explicitly determined, without needing to rely on numerical calculations.
22 When 1 ≤ k < 2 we use the system of differential equations given by
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Fig. 2. The expected revenue as a function of k for the three auctions: first RF
k
, second RS
k
and optimal ROP
k
.
5. Robustness
The model was based on a number of simplifying assumptions, and at this point we are
interested in assessing the impact of relaxing them in our conclusions. In this section some
alternative formulations are examined.
We have assumed here that V = xA + xD which does not allow to see how different assump-
tions on partial derivatives (including cross partial derivatives) affect the results.23 To undertake
this analysis we here take V = g(xA + xD) for any continuous function g. Under this more gen-
eral formulation the equilibrium bidding functions are the solutions to the system of differential
(Γk)′(x) = −bAk (x)φDk (x) − bDk (x)φAk (x)
(φA
k
)′(x) = (φ
A
k
(x))2k(2k − 1) + kxφA
k
(x)
(2 − k)x2 + kxφA
k
(x)
(φD
k
)′(x) = (φ
D
k
(x))2(2 − k) + kxφD
k
(x)
(2k − 1)x2 + kxφD
k
(x)
with the initial conditions φD
k
(1) = φA
k
(1) = 1 and Γk(1) = 0. The first (auxiliary) equation is obtained by deriving
Γk(x) =
∫ 1
x
bAk (s)φDk (s) ds +
∫ 1
x
bDk (s)φAk (s) ds
with respect to x. Notice that Γk(0) = Rk , as it equals the sum of the bidders’ expected payments. We numerically integrate
(backwards) system above by using a Runge–Kutta method. Finally, to measure how the solutions change with k, we take
a fine discrete grid of values of k. For k ∈ [2, 3) a similar method can be followed but taking for each k the values of s(k)
and r(k) that determine the initial conditions.
23 We are very grateful to an anonymous referee who pointed this out.
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equations
bAk (xA) + (bAk )
′(xA)xA = g(φDk (xA) + xA),
bDk (xD) + (bDk )
′(xD)xD = kg(φAk (xD) + xD)
with boundary conditions: bAk (0) = bDk (0) = 0 and bAk (1) = bDk (1) = m(k).
Using similar techniques to the ones employed in Section 3 it is easy to derive explicit
expressions for the bidding functions in terms of the function g. They are given by:
bAk (xA) =
k
∫
g(u) du
φDk (xA) + kxA
,
and
bDk (xD) =
k
∫
g(z) dz
kφAk (xD) + xD
,
where u = xA + φDk (xA), and z = φAk (xD) + xD. For instance, when g(y) = ys, the bidding func-
tions become
bAk (xA) =
k
s + 1
(φDk (xA) + xA)
s+1
φDk (xA) + kxA
, (17)
and
bDk (xD) =
k
s + 1
(xD + φAk (xD))
s+1
kφAk (xD) + xD
· (18)
From the particular analytic structure of the above biding functions, it seems reasonable to claim
that the results derived when V = xA + xD will also hold if V = (xA + xD)s, s > 0. To asses this
claim we have numerically computed the equilibrium for two particular functional forms V =
(xA + xD)2 for which (∂2V/(∂xA∂xD)) > 0, and V = (xA + xD)1/2 for which (∂2V/(∂xA∂xD)) <
0.
To do so, we have concentrated on the region of small asymmetries. Note that the range of k
in this region, k ∈ [1, ˜k], depends on the common-value functional form. If V = (xA + xD)2 then
˜k is such that the valuation of player A-0, conditional upon winning over any type of player D,
is equal to the smallest possible valuation of player D-1, i.e., ˜k(1/2)2 = 1, which implies ˜k = 4.
Similarly, if V = (xA + xD)1/2 then ˜k =
√
2 as ˜k(1/2)1/2 = 1. Once the range of k values is deter-
mined, we derive and then numerically solve, the implicit equations that define the equilibrium
correspondences. Finally, we substitute these expressions into (17) and (18) and we numerically
compute the bidding functions in the three cases, i.e., s = 1/2, 1, 2.
In Fig. 3(a) we show the equilibrium bidding functions for an advantageous bidders for k = 1.1
in the three scenarios, while Fig. 3(b) shows the equilibrium bidding functions of the disadvan-
tageous bidder.24 It stems from these figures that the explosive impact on auction outcomes,
resulting from the tiniest asymmetry, in second-price auctions do not extend to the first-price
auction format. Furthermore, the numerically computed bidding functions are close to the sym-
metric equilibrium bidding function in the three cases, confirming the robustness of Theorem 6
to changes in the common-value functional form.
24 Note that k = 1.1 lies in the range of small asymmetries in the three scenarios.
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Fig. 3. The equilibrium biding functions for s = 1/2, s = 1 and s = 2. (a) corresponds to bidder A while (b) corresponds
to bidder D.
Fig. 4. The expected revenue as a function of k, for s = 1/2, s = 1 and s = 2.
Finally, to further illustrate the behavior of the first-price auction format we here also provide a
graphical representation of the seller’s expected revenue in the three scenarios. Note that revenue
is a monotone function of the degree of asymmetry, as illustrated in Fig. 4.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. First note that in a first-price auction the highest possible bid by each side
must be the same. Otherwise, the player with the highest bid would be better off reducing his bid;
he can still win with probability one while paying a lesser price. This fact provides the boundary
condition: bAk (1) = bDk (1) = m(k). We can hence define the bidding range as bids (or prices) below
m(k). In what follows we only consider the range of prices which are common to both players.
We first show that there cannot be simultaneous atoms at the same price. Assume that p is
an atom for player i, i = A,D, i.e., there is an interval of signals of player i who are bidding the
same price p. If this is the case, then all types of player j who get strictly positive expected utility
when bidding p, must prefer to bid slightly above the atom. Just note that this -small deviation
generates a positive surplus coming from the positive mass (atom) of i-players all bidding p.
Hence, the only types of player j that could prefer to bid p rather than p +  are those who get
zero expected profits at p. But this can only happen for one type of player j as, for each player,
the value is strictly increasing in her signal.
We now use the result above to show, by contradiction, that there cannot be gaps. Assume that
player i has a gap at some interval within the common range, say (p1, p2]. Clearly, any player j is
better off bidding outside the gap. Further, unless player i has an atom at the top of the gap, player
j would do better to lower the price at p1 than to pay p = p2 + . The reason is that by doing so
she lowers the price she has to pay by a positive (away from 0) amount, while she only reduces her
probability of winning by . Consequently, j must have a gap from p1 or less to p¯ > p2, contradict-
ing that i bids in equilibrium p2. Consider then that i has an atom at the top of her gap. Then, either
j also has an atom at p2 which cannot happen in equilibrium as shown before, or j bids p2 with
zero probability. But then i should not bid p2 with a positive probability. We can hence conclude
that the bidding functions must be single-valued and continuous on the common range of prices.
We now show that if k ∈ [1, 2) then the common bidding range is the full range of prices. To do
so we only need to show that the lowest bid is the same for both players, that is bAk (0) = bDk (0). If
bAk (0) < bDk (0) then either bidder D-0 is losing money and she would hence do better decreasing
her bid or bidder A-0 can do strictly better by increasing her bid. Consider now that bAk (0) > bDk (0).
By continuity of the equilibrium bidding functions there must exist x˜ > 0 such that bAk (0) = bDk (x˜),
so that types y, y ≤ x˜, of player D make zero profit. These types must find unprofitable to increase
their bid or, otherwise, they would deviate. It must hence be the case that bAk (0) ≥ x˜. Further, since
bidder A-0 cannot make negative profits, it must also be true that bAk (0) ≤ k(x˜/2). Notice that
k(x˜/2) ≥ bAk (0) ≥ x˜ holds if and only if k ≥ 2. Consequently, if k < 2 then bDk (0) = bAk (0) = 0,
where the last equality follows straightforwardly.
To complete the proof we have to show that strategies are strictly increasing in the types so that
there are no (individual) atoms. Observe that if i has an atom in the common range then there is
no xj that is willing to bid just after the atom ends; xj would prefer to bid just below (if the value
conditional on winning the types within the atom is smaller that the price) or, just above (if the
bid gets increased by an arbitrarily small amount whereas the probability of winning increases
by the range of the atom). Consequently, since we have shown that there are no gaps, any atom
must be at the bottom of the common bidding range. But this cannot be the case either. Note
that if k < 2 it would imply that a player with signal larger than 0 follows a weakly dominated
strategy (bids zero rather than close to her positive signal). Since there can be no interval within
the common bidding range at which a bidder bids with probability zero, players cannot choose
mixed strategies. 
21
Lemma 14. The functions bAk (xA) and bDk (xD) are differentiable.
Proof. We prove the statement only for bAk (xA), the proof for bDk (xD) is similar and it is omitted.
First we show that the function xAbAk (xA) is differentiable (so the expected utility is).
Since type xD = φDk (xA) must prefer to bid bA(xA) rather than bA(xA + xA), it must follow
that [
φDk (xA) +
xA
2
− bAk (xA)
]
xA ≥
[
φDk (xA) +
xA + xA
2
− bAk (xA + xA)
]
(xA + xA).
Rearranging we get
bAk (xA + xA)(xA + xA) − bAk (xA)xA
xA
≥ φDk (xA) + xA +
xA
2
,
or, equivalently,
lim
xA→0
bAk (xA + xA)(xA + xA) − bAk (xA)xA
xA
≥ φDk (xA) + xA.
Since type φDk (xA + xA) must also prefer to bid bAk (xA + xA) than bAk (xA), similar compu-
tations to those used above yield the same equation but with the inequality reversed, and with
lim sup instead of lim inf. From these two inequalities we conclude that the right derivative exists
and is given by φDk (xA) + xA. Using xA − xA instead xA + xA it is easily verified that the left
derivative exists and is also given by φDk (xA) + xA. Since the left and right derivative exist and
coincide, the function bAk (xA)xA is differentiable, as desired.
Once we know the differentiability of xAbAk (xA) we want to show the differentiability of bAk (xA)
for all xA ∈ (0, 1). If there were a point z∈ (0, 1) for which the right and left hand side limits of
the incremental quotients for bAk were not the same, this would imply, by taken the suitable limits,
that z∈ (0, 1) is a non differentiable point for xAbAk as well, a contradiction. 
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